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Abstract
We present a novel approach that protects trajectory privacy of users who access location-
based services through a moving k nearest neighbor (MkNN) query. An MkNN query
continuously returns the k nearest data objects for a moving user (query point). Simply
updating a user’s imprecise location such as a region instead of the exact position to a location-
based service provider (LSP) cannot ensure privacy of the user for an MkNN query: continuous
disclosure of regions enables the LSP to follow a user’s trajectory. We identify the problem
of trajectory privacy that arises from the overlap of consecutive regions while requesting an
MkNN query and provide the first solution to this problem. Our approach allows a user to
specify the confidence level that represents a bound of how much more the user may need to
travel than the actual kth nearest data object. By hiding a user’s required confidence level and
the required number of nearest data objects from an LSP, we develop a technique to prevent the
LSP from tracking the user’s trajectory for MkNN queries. We propose an efficient algorithm
for the LSP to find k nearest data objects for a region with a user’s specified confidence
level, which is an essential component to evaluate an MkNN query in a privacy preserving
manner; this algorithm is at least two times faster than the state-of-the-art algorithm. Extensive
experimental studies validate the effectiveness of our trajectory privacy protection technique
and the efficiency of our algorithm.
1 Introduction
Location-based services (LBSs) are developing at an unprecedented pace: having started as web-
based queries that did not take a user’s actual location into account (e.g., Google maps), LBSs can
nowadays be accessed anywhere via a mobile device using the device’s location (e.g., displaying
nearby restaurants on a cell phone relative to its current location). While LBSs provide many
conveniences, they also threaten our privacy. Since a location-based service provider (LSP) knows
the locations of its users, a user’s continuous access of LBSs enables the LSP to produce a complete
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profile of the user’s trajectory with a high degree of spatial and temporal precision. From this
profile, the LSP may infer private information about users. A threat to privacy is becoming more
urgent as positioning devices become more precise, and a lack of addressing privacy issues may
significantly impair the proliferation of LBSs [1, 32].
An important class of LBSs are moving k nearest neighbor (MkNN) queries. An MkNN query
continuously returns the k nearest data objects with regard to a moving query point. For example,
a driver may continuously ask for the closest gas station during a trip and select the most preferred
one; similarly, a tourist may continuously query the five nearest restaurants while exploring a city.
However, accessing an MkNN query requires continuous updates of user locations to the LSP,
which puts the user’s privacy at risk. The user’s trajectory (i.e., the sequence of updated locations)
is sensitive data and reveals private information. For example if the user’s trajectory intersects the
region of a liver clinic, then the LSP might infer that the user is suffering from a liver disease.
A popular approach to hide a user’s location from the LSP is to let the user send an
imprecise location (typically a rectangular region containing the user’s location) instead of the
exact location [6, 10, 15, 38]. This approach is effective when the user’s location is fixed. However,
when the user moves and continuously sends the rectangular regions containing her locations to
the LSP, the LSP can still approximate the user’s trajectory if it takes into account the overlap of
consecutive rectangles, which poses a threat to the trajectory privacy of the user. This privacy threat
on the user’s trajectory privacy is called the overlapping rectangle attack. Our aim is to protect a
user’s trajectory privacy while providing MkNN answers. We call the problem of answering MkNN
queries with privacy protection, the private moving kNN (PMkNN) query. Although different
approaches [6, 7, 15, 17, 35, 36] have been developed for protecting a user’s trajectory privacy
in continuous queries, none of them have considered the threat on a user’s trajectory privacy that
arises from the overlapping rectangle attack in MkNN queries. This paper is the first work that
addresses PMkNN queries.
In our approach, users have an option to specify the level of accuracy for the query answers,
which is motivated by the following observation. In many cases, users would accept answers
with a slightly lower accuracy if they gain higher privacy protection in return. For example, a
driver looking for the closest gas station might not mind driving to a gas station that may be 5%
further than the actual closest one, if the slightly longer trip considerably enhances the driver’s
privacy. In this context, “lower accuracy” of the answers means that the returned data objects
are not necessarily the k nearest data objects: they might be a subset of the (k + x) nearest data
objects, where x is a small integer. However, we guarantee that their distances to the query point are
within a certain ratio of the actual kth nearest neighbor’s distance. We define a parameter called
confidence level to characterize this ratio. In addition to protecting privacy, we will show that a
lower confidence level also reduces the query processing overhead.
For every update of a user’s imprecise location (a rectangle) in a PMkNN query, the LSP
provides the user with a candidate answer set that includes the specified number of nearest data
objects (i.e., k nearest data objects) with the specified confidence level for every possible point
in the rectangle. The key idea of our privacy protection strategy is to specify higher values for
the confidence level and the number of nearest data objects than required by the user and not to
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reveal the required confidence level and the required number of nearest data objects to the LSP.
Since the user’s required confidence level and the required number of nearest data objects are
lower than the specified ones, the candidate answer set must contain the required query answers
for an additional part of the user’s trajectory, which is unknown to the LSP. Based on this idea,
we develop an algorithm to compute the user’s consecutive rectangles, that resists the overlapping
rectangle attack and prevents the disclosure of the user’s trajectory. Although our approach for
privacy works if either the required confidence level or the required number of nearest data objects
is hidden, hiding both provides a user with a higher level of privacy.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper.
• We identify the problem of trajectory privacy that arises from the overlap of consecutive
regions while requesting an MkNN query. We propose the first approach to address
PMkNN queries. Specifically, a user (a client) sends requests for an MkNN query based
on consecutive rectangles, and the LSP (the server) returns k nearest neighbors (NNs) for
any possible point in the rectangle. We show how to compute the consecutive rectangles and
how to find the k NNs for these rectangles so that the user’s trajectory remains private.
• We propose three ways to combat the privacy threat in MkNN queries: by requesting (i) a
higher confidence level than required, (ii) a higher number of NNs than required, or (iii)
higher values for both the confidence level and the number of NNs than required to the LSP.
• We improve the efficiency of the algorithm for the LSP to find k NNs for a rectangle with a
user-customizable confidence level by exploiting different geometric properties.
• We present an extensive experimental study to demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness
of our approach. Our proposed algorithm for the LSP is at least two times faster than the
state-of-the-art.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the problem setup and
Section 3 reviews existing work. In Section 4, we give a overview of our system and in Section 5,
we introduce the concept of confidence level. Sections 6 and 7 present our algorithms to request
and evaluate a PMkNN query, respectively. Section 8 reports our experimental results and Section 9
concludes the paper with future research directions.
2 Problem Formulation
A moving kNN (MkNN) query is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (MkNN query) Let D denote a set of data objects in a two dimensional database,
q the moving query point, and k a positive integer. An MkNN query returns for every position of q,
a set A that consists of k data objects whose distances from q are less or equal to those of the data
objects in D − A.
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A private static kNN query protects a user’s privacy while processing a kNN query.
Traditionally for private static kNN queries, the user requests k NNs1 to the LSP with a rectangle
that includes the current position of the user [10, 14, 31, 38]. Since the LSP does not know the
actual location of the user in the rectangle, it returns the k nearest data objects with respect to
every point of the rectangle.
There is no universally accepted view on what privacy protection implies for a user. On
the one hand, it could mean hiding the user’s identity but revealing the user’s precise location
while accessing an LBS, which prevents an LSP from knowing what type of services have been
accessed by whom. On the other hand, it could mean protecting privacy of the user’s location while
disclosing the user’s identity to the LSP.
For the first scenario, a user reveals her location to the LSP and requests an LBS via a third
party (e.g., pseudonym service provider) to hide her identity from the LSP. However, accessing an
LBS anonymously does not always protect the user’s privacy since the LSP could infer the user’s
identity from the revealed location. For example, if a user requests a service from her home, office
or any other place that is known to the LSP then the user can be identified. To address this issue,
K-anonymity techniques [13, 18] have been developed. In K-anonymity techniques, the user’s
rectangle includes K − 1 other user locations in addition to the user’s location and thus make the
user’s identity indistinguishable from K−1 other users even if the actual user locations are known
to the LSP.
In this paper, we consider the second scenario where the user’s location is unknown to the LSP
since the user considers her location as private and sensitive information. We address how to protect
privacy of the user’s trajectory when the user’s identity is revealed, and do not use K-anonymity
for the following reasons:
1. K-anonymity techniques hide the user’s identity from the LSP and assume that the user’s
location could be known to the LSP. On the other hand, our focus is to protect the user’s
trajectory privacy while disclosing the user’s identity. Revealing the user’s identity enables
the LSP to provide personalized query answers [15, 38]; as an example the LSP can return
only those gas stations as MkNN answers which provide a higher discount for the user’s
credit card.
2. K-anonymity techniques alone cannot protect privacy of the user’s location when the user’s
identity is revealed. For example if a user is located at the liver clinic and there are otherK−1
users at the same clinic, then the user’s rectangle also resides in the liver clinic. However, the
rectangle needs to include other places in addition to the liver clinic for protecting the privacy
of the user’s location. The higher the number of different places the rectangle includes in
addition to the liver clinic, the lower the probability that the user is located at the liver
clinic. Since integrating K-anonymity techniques in our approach do not increase the level
of privacy of a user’s location, we do not integrate K-anonymity techniques.
1In this paper, we use NN and nearest data object interchangeably.
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In our approach, the user sets her rectangle area according to her privacy requirement and the
user’s location cannot be refined to a subset of that rectangle at the time of issuing the query. For
example, a user can set the size of the rectangle covering a suburb of the California or covering the
whole California region if a high level privacy is required.
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Figure 1: (a) Overlapping rectangle attack, (b) maximum movement bound attack, and (c)
combined attack
For a private moving kNN (PMkNN) query, a straightforward attempt to address the PMkNN
query is to apply the private static kNN query iteratively such that the user has the k nearest data
objects for every position of q, where the moving user’s locations are updated in a periodic manner.
However, the straightforward application of private static kNN queries for processing an MkNN
query cannot protect the user’s trajectory privacy, which is explained in the next section.
2.1 Threat model for MkNN queries
Applying private static kNN queries to a PMkNN query requires that the user (the moving query
point) continuously updates her location as a rectangle to an LSP so that the kNN answers are
ensured for every point of her trajectory. The LSP simply returns the k NNs for every point of her
requested rectangle. Thus, the moving user already has the k NNs for every position in the current
rectangle. Since an MkNN query provides answers for every point of the user’s trajectory, the next
request for a new rectangle can be issued at any point before the user leaves the current rectangle.
We also know that in a private static kNN query, a rectangle includes the user’s current location at
the time of requesting the rectangle to the LSP. Therefore, a straightforward application of private
static kNN queries for processing an MkNN query requires the overlap of consecutive rectangles
as shown in Figure 1(a). These overlaps refine the user’s locations within the disclosed rectangles
to the LSP and decrease the privacy of the user’s location. In the worst case, a user can issue the
next request for a new rectangle when the user moves to the boundary of the current rectangle to
ensure the availability of kNN answers for every point of the user’s trajectory in real time. Even in
this worst case scenario, the consecutive rectangles needs to overlap at least at a point, which is the
user’s current location. We define the above described privacy threat as the overlapping rectangle
attack.
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Definition 2.2 (Overlapping rectangle attack) Let {R1, R2, ..., Rn} be a set of n consecutive
rectangles requested by a user to an LSP in an MkNN query, where Rw and Rw+1 overlap for
1 ≤ w < n. Since a user’s location lies in the rectangle at the time it is sent to the LSP
and the moving user requires the k NNs for every position, the user’s location has to be in
Rw ∩ Rw+1 at the time of sending Rw+1, and the user’s trajectory must intersect Rw ∩ Rw+1.
As (Rw ∩ Rw+1) ⊂ Rw, Rw+1, the overlapping rectangle attack enables an LSP to render more
precise locations of a user and gradually reveal the user’s trajectory.
There is another possible attack on a user’s trajectory privacy for MkNN queries when the
user’s maximum velocity is known. Existing research [6, 15, 26, 35] has shown that if an LSP
has rectangles from the same user at different times and the LSP knows the user’s maximum
velocity, then it is possible to refine a user’s approximated location from the overlap of the
current rectangle and the maximum movement bound with respect to the previous rectangle, called
maximum movement bound attack. Figure 1(b) shows an example of this attack in an MkNN query
that determines more precise location of a user in the overlap of R2 and the maximum movement
bound M1 with respect to R1 at the time of sending R2.
For an MkNN query, the maximum movement bounding attack is weaker than the overlapping
rectangle attack as (Rw ∩ Rw+1) ⊂ (Mw ∩ Rw+1). However, we observe that the combination of
overlapping rectangle and maximum movement bound attacks can be stronger than each individual
attack as shown in Figure 1(c). In this example at the time of issuing R3, the LSP derives M2 from
R1∩R2 rather than fromR2 and identifies the user’s more precise location asR2∩R3∩M2, where
(R2 ∩R3 ∩M2) ⊂ (R2 ∩R3) and (R2 ∩R3 ∩M2) ⊂ (R3 ∩M2).
With the above described attacks, the LSP can progressively find more precise locations of
a user and approximate the user’s trajectory. As a result the LSP could also generate a complete
profile of the user’s activities from the identified trajectory. Hence, protecting the trajectory privacy
of users as much as possible while processing an MkNN query is essential.
2.2 Trajectory privacy for MkNN queries
Trajectory privacy protection with respect to a rectangle is defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 (Trajectory privacy protection with respect to a rectangle) The user’s trajectory
privacy is protected with respect to a rectangle, if the following conditions hold:
1. The user’s location at the time of sending a rectangle cannot be refined to a subset of that
rectangle.
2. The user’s trajectory cannot be refined to a subset of that rectangle.
The first condition removes the certainty that the location of a user at the time of issuing a
rectangle is within the overlap of rectangles and the maximum movement bound. The second
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condition ensures that a user’s trajectory does not have to intersect the overlap of consecutive
rectangles.
A privacy protection technique that satisfies Definition 2.3 can overcome the overlapping
rectangle attack and the maximum movement bound attack that refine parts of a user’s trajectory
within the rectangles. However, the LSP can still refine the user’s trajectory within the data
space from the available knowledge of the LSP. Since there is no measure to quantify trajectory
privacy, we measure trajectory privacy as the (smallest) area to which an adversary can refine the
trajectory location relative to the data space. We call it trajectory area and define it in the Section
Experiments, as it requires concepts which are introduced later in the paper. Note that the larger
the trajectory area is, the higher is the user’s trajectory privacy and the higher is the probability that
the area is associated with different sensitive locations and, as a result, the lower is the probability
that the user’s trajectory could be linked to a specific location. We also measure a user’s trajectory
privacy by the number of requested rectangles per trajectory for a fixed area, i.e., the frequency,
the smaller the number of requested rectangles, the less spatial constraints are available to the LSP
for predicting the trajectory.
2.2.1 Overview of our approach for PMkNN queries
A naı¨ve solution to avoid overlapping rectangles is to request next rectangle after the user leaves
the current rectangle. However, this solution cannot provide an answer for the part of the trajectory
between two rectangles: this violates the definition of MkNN query, which asks for k NNs for
every point of the trajectory. Figure 2 shows an example, where a user requests non overlapping
rectangles and thus the user does not have kNN answers for parts of the trajectory between points
q1 and q2, and q3 and q4.
 d
 c
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Figure 2: A naı¨ve solution: kNN answers may not be available to the user for parts of the trajectory
between q1 and q2, and q3 and q4
In this paper, we propose a solution to overcome the overlapping rectangle attack on the
user’s trajectory privacy for MkNN queries. We ensure that the proposed solution satisfies the two
required conditions for trajectory privacy protection (see Definition 3) for every rectangle requested
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to the LSP and provides the user kNN answers for every point of her trajectory. In our approach,
a user does not always need to send non-overlapping rectangles to avoid the overlapping rectangle
attack. We show that our approach does not allow the LSP to refine the user’s location or trajectory
within the rectangle even if the user sends overlapping rectangles. The underlying idea is to have
the required answers for an additional part of the user’s trajectory without the LSP’s knowledge. As
the user has the required answers for an additional part of her trajectory, the consecutive rectangles
do not have to always overlap. Even if the rectangles overlap, there is no guarantee that the user
is located in the overlap at the time of sending the rectangle to the LSP and the user’s trajectory
passes through the overlap. To achieve the answers for an additional part of the user’s trajectory
without informing the LSP, the user requests a higher confidence level and a higher number of NNs
than required and does not reveal the required values to the LSP. Our approach also prevents the
maximum movement bound attack based on the existing solutions [6, 15, 26, 35] in the literature
if the LSP knows the user’s maximum velocity.
3 Related Work
Section 3.1 surveys existing research on protecting trajectory privacy in continuous LBSs and
Section 3.2 highlights the trajectory privacy concern in other applications.
3.1 Privacy protection in continuous LBSs
Most research on user privacy in LBSs has focused on static location-based queries that include
nearest neighbor queries [14, 20, 21, 27, 31, 40], group nearest neighbor queries [22] and proximity
services [30]. Different strategies such as K-anonymity, obfuscation, l-diversity, and cryptography
have been proposed to protect the privacy of users.
K-anonymity techniques (e.g., [18, 31]) make a user’s identity indistinguishable within a group
of K users. Obfuscation techniques (e.g., [11, 40]) degrade the quality of a user’s location by
revealing an imprecise or inaccurate location and l-diversity techniques (e.g., [10, 38]) ensure that
the user’s location is indistinguishable from other l − 1 diverse locations. Both obfuscation, and
l-diversity techniques focus on hiding the user’s location from the LSP instead of the identity.
Cryptographic techniques (e.g., [16, 28]) allow users to access LBSs without revealing their
locations to the LSP, however, these techniques incur cryptographic overhead and require an
encrypted database. In this paper, we assume that the LSP evaluates a PMkNN query on a non-
encrypted database.
K-anonymity, obfuscation, or l-diversity based approaches for private static queries cannot
protect privacy of users for continuous LBSs because they consider each request of a continuous
query as an independent event, i.e., the correlation among the subsequent requests is not taken into
account. Recently different approaches [5, 7, 36, 17, 6, 15, 35, 37] have been proposed to address
this issue.
The authors in K-anonymity based approaches [5, 7, 36, 17] for continuous queries focus on
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the privacy threat on a user’s identity that arises from the intersection of different sets of K users
involved in the consecutive requests of a continuous query. Since we focus on how to hide a user’s
trajectory while disclosing the user’s identity to the LSP, these approaches are not applicable for
our purpose. On the other hand, existing obfuscation and l-diversity based approaches [6, 15, 35]
for continuous queries have only addressed the threat of the maximum movement bound attack.
However, none of these approaches have identified the threat on trajectory privacy that arises
from the overlap of consecutive regions (e.g., rectangles). The trajectory anonymization technique
proposed in [37] assumes that a user knows her trajectory in advance for which an LBS is required,
whereas other approaches including ours consider an unknown future trajectory of the user.
3.1.1 Existing kNN algorithms
To provide the query answers to the user, the LSP needs an algorithm to evaluate a kNN query
for the user’s location. Depth first search (DFS) [34] and best first search (BFS) [23] are two well
known algorithms to find the k NNs with respect to a point using an R-tree [19]. If the value of
k is unknown, e.g., for an incremental kNN queries, the next set of NNs can be determined with
BFS. We use BFS in our proposed algorithm to evaluate a kNN query with respect to a rectangle.
The BFS starts the search from the root of the R-tree and stores the child nodes in a priority queue.
The priority queue is ordered based on the minimum distance between the query point and the
minimum bounding rectangles (MBRs) of R-tree nodes or data objects. In the next step, it removes
an element from the queue, where the element is the node representing the MBR with the minimum
distance from the query point. Then the algorithm again stores the child nodes or data objects of
the removed node on the priority queue. The process continues until k data objects are removed
from the queue.
Researchers have also focused on developing algorithms [8, 9, 25, 27, 31, 35] for evaluating a
kNN query for a user’s imprecise location such as a rectangle or a circle. In [9], the authors have
proposed an approximation algorithm that ensures that the answer set contains one of the k NNs
for every point of a rectangle. The limitation of their approximation is that users do not know how
much more they need to travel with respect to the actual NN, i.e., the accuracy of answers. Our
algorithm allows users to specify the accuracy of answers using a confidence level.
To prevent the overlapping rectangle attack, our proposed approach requires a kNN algorithm
that returns a candidate answer set including all data objects of a region in addition to the k NNs
with respect to every point of a user’s imprecise location. The availability of all data objects for a
known region to the user in combination with the concept of hiding the user’s required confidence
level and the required number of NNs from the LSP can prevent the overlapping rectangle attack
(see Section 6). Among all existing kNN algorithms for a user’s imprecise location [8, 9, 25,
27, 31, 35], only Casper [31] supports a known region; the algorithm returns all data objects of
a rectangular region (i.e., the known region) that include the NNs with respect to a rectangle.
However, Casper can only work for NN queries and it is not straightforward to extend Casper for
k > 1. Thus, even if Casper is modified to incorporate the confidence level concept, it can only
support PMkNN queries for k = 1.
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Moreover, for a single nearest neighbor query, Casper needs to perform on the database
multiple searches, which incur high computational overhead. Casper executes four individual
single nearest neighbor queries with respect to four corner points of the rectangle. Then using
these neighbors as filters, Casper expands the rectangle in all directions to compute a range that
contains the NNs with respect to all points of the rectangle. Finally, Casper has to again execute a
range query to retrieve the candidate answer set. We propose an efficient algorithm that finds the
kNNs with a specified confidence level for a rectangle in a single search.
3.2 Trajectory privacy in other applications
Protecting a user’s trajectory privacy has also received much attention in other domains [2, 4,
24, 33, 39]. The advancement and widespread use of location aware devices (e.g., GPS equipped
mobile phone or vehicle) have enabled users to share their trajectories with others. Such trajectory
data allows organizations and researchers to perform useful analyses for many applications such as
urban planning, traffic monitoring, and mining human behavior. To protect user trajectories, they
are modified before they are released so that both user privacy and data utility are maintained.
Recent research has developed a few anonymization approaches [2, 33, 39] for publishing privacy
preserving trajectory data, where a trusted server first collects trajectories from users and then
publishes them in public after their anonymization. Prior studies [4, 24] also consider scenarios
without a trusted server, which means a user’s trajectory is anonymized before it is shared with
anyone. The purpose of these approaches is to protect trajectory privacy through anonymization
while maintaining the utility of trajectory data for different analyses. On the other hand, our
approach protects trajectory privacy while answering MkNN queries in a personalized manner (i.e.,
the user’s identity is revealed); therefore our studied problem is orthogonal to the above problem.
4 System Overview
Our approach for PMkNN queries is based on the client-server model. In our system, a client is a
moving user who sends a PMkNN query request and the server is the LSP that processes the query.
The moving user sends her imprecise location as a rectangle to the LSP, which we call obfuscation
rectangle in the remainder of this paper.
We introduce the parameter confidence level, which provides a user with an option to trade the
accuracy of the query answers for trajectory privacy. Intuitively, the confidence level of the user for
a data object guarantees that the distance of the data object to the user’s location is within a bound
of the actual nearest data object’s distance. In Section 5, we formally define and show how a user
and an LSP can compute the confidence level for a data object.
In our system, a user does not reveal the required confidence level and the required number
of NNs to the LSP while requesting a PMkNN query; instead the user specifies higher values
than the required ones. This allows the user to have the required number of NNs with the
required confidence level for an additional part of her trajectory, which is unknown to the LSP,
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and thus the LSP cannot apply the overlapping rectangle attack by correlating the user’s current
obfuscation rectangle with the previous one. In Section 6, we present a technique to compute
a user’s consecutive obfuscation rectangles for requesting a PMkNN query. Another important
advantage of our technique is that for the computation of the consecutive obfuscation rectangles,
the user does not need to trust any other party such as an intermediary trusted server [31].
An essential component of our approach for a PMkNN query is an algorithm for the LSP that
finds the specified number of NNs for the obfuscation rectangle with the specified confidence level.
In Section 7, we exploit different properties of the confidence level with respect to an obfuscation
rectangle to develop an efficient algorithm in a single traversal of the R-tree.
5 Confidence Level
The confidence level represents a measure of the accuracy for a nearest data object with respect
to a user’s location. If the confidence level of a user for the k nearest data objects is 1 then they
are the actual k NNs. If the confidence level is less than 1 then it provides a worst case bound of
how much more a user may need to travel than the actual kth nearest data object. For example, a
nearest data object with 0.5 confidence level means that the user has to travel twice the distance to
the actual NN in the worst case.
To determine the confidence level of a user for any nearest data object, we need to know the
locations of other data objects surrounding the user’s location. The region where the location of all
data objects are known is called the known region. We first show how an LSP and a user compute
the known region, and then discuss the confidence level.
o
r
Data object
wR
)o;r(C
Figure 3: Known Region
5.1 Computing a known region
Suppose a user provides an obfuscation rectangle Rw for any positive integer w, to the LSP while
requesting a PMkNN query. For the ease of explanation, we assume at the moment that the user
specifies confidence level of 1, i.e., the answer set returned by the LSP includes the actual kNN
answers for the given obfuscation rectangle. Our proposed algorithm for the LSP to evaluate kNN
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answers, starts a best first search (BFS) considering the center o of Rw as the query point and
incrementally finds the next NN from o until the actual k NNs are discovered for all points of Rw.
The search region covered by BFS at any stage of its execution is a circular region C(o, r), where
the center o is the center of Rw and the radius r is the distance between o and the last discovered
data object. Since the locations of all data objects in C(o, r) are already discovered, C(o, r) is
the known region for the LSP. The LSP returns all data objects located within C(o, r) to the user,
although some of them might not be the k NNs with respect to any point of Rw. This enables
the user to have C(o, r) as the known region. This enables the user to have C(o, r) as the known
region, where the center o is the center of Rw and the radius r is the distance between o and the
farthest retrieved data object from o.
))hq;p(q;dist(
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Figure 4: Confidence Level
5.2 Measuring the confidence level
Since the confidence level can have any value in the range (0,1], we remove our previous
assumption of a fixed confidence level of 1 in Section 5.1. In our approach, the knowledge about
the known region C(o, r) is used to measure the confidence level. Let ph be the nearest data
object among all data objects in C(o, r) from a given location q, where h is an index to name
the data objects and let dist(q, ph) represent the Euclidean distance between q and ph. There are
two possible scenarios based on different positions of ph and q in C(o, r). Figure 4(a) shows a case
where the circular region C ′(q, dist(q, ph)) centered at q with radius dist(q, ph) is within C(o, r).
Since ph is the nearest data object from q within C(o, r), no other data object can be located within
C ′(q, dist(q, ph)). This case provides the user at q with a confidence level 1 for ph. However,
C ′(q, dist(q, ph)) might not be always completely within the known region. Figure 4(b)(left) shows
such a case, where a part of C ′(q, dist(q, ph)) falls outside C(o, r) and as the locations of data
objects outside C(o, r) are not known, there might be some data objects located in the part of
C ′(q, dist(q, ph)) outside C(o, r) (i.e., C ′′ = C ′(q, dist(q, ph)) \ C(o, r)) that have a smaller
distance than ph from q. Since ph is the nearest data object from q within C(o, r), there is no
data object within distance r′ from q (Figure 4(b)(right)), where r′ is the radius of the maximum
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circular region within C(o, r) centered at q. But there might be other data objects within a fixed
distance df from q, where r′ < df ≤ dist(q, ph). In this case the confidence level of the user at q
regarding ph is less than 1. On the other hand, if q is outside of C(o, r) then the confidence level of
the user at q for ph is 0 because r′ is 0. We formally define the confidence level of a user located at
q for ph in the more general case, where ph is any of the nearest data object in C(o, r).
Definition 5.1 (Confidence level) Let C(o, r) be the known region, P the set of data objects in
C(o, r), q the point location of a user, ph the jth nearest data object in P from q for 1 ≤ j ≤ |P |.
The distance r′ represents the radius of the maximum circular region within C(o, r) centered at q.
The confidence level of the user located at q for ph, CL(q, ph), can be expressed as:
CL(q, ph) :=

0 if q /∈ C(o, r)
1 if q ∈ C(o, r) ∧ dist(q, ph) ≤ r′
r′
dist(q,ph)
otherwise.
Since our focus is on NN queries, we use distance instead of area as the metric for the
confidence level. A distance-based metric ensures that there is no other data object within a fixed
distance from the position of a user. Thus, the distance-based metric is a measure of accuracy
for a data object to be the nearest one. On the other hand, an area-based metric is based on
the percentage of the area of C ′(q, dist(q, ph)) that intersects with C(o, r). Thus, an area-based
metric only could be used to express the likelihood of an data object to be the nearest one.
However, an area-based metric cannot measure the accuracy of the data object to be the nearest
one. Furthermore, such a metric would assume a uniform random distribution of data objects.
Consider an example where q is outside C(o, r) and ph is the nearest data object from q in C(o, r).
According to the area-based metric the confidence level of the user for ph would be greater than
0, i.e., (C ′(q, dist(q, ph)) ∩ C(o, r))/C ′(q, dist(q, ph))), although there is nothing known about
the data objects outside the known region. This measure based on the area-based metric does not
represent a bound of how much more a user may need to travel for ph than the actual nearest data
object in the worst case.
6 Client-side Processing
We present a technique for computing consecutive obfuscation rectangles of a user to request a
PMkNN query, where the LSP cannot apply the overlapping rectangle attack to invade the user’s
trajectory privacy. Suppose a user requests an obfuscation rectangleRw and a confidence level cl at
any stage of accessing the PMkNN query. The LSP returns P , the set of data objects in the known
region C(o, r), that includes the k NNs with a confidence level at least cl for every point of Rw.
The availability of C(o, r) allows a moving user to compute the confidence level for the k NNs
even from outside of Rw.
Although some data objects in P might not be the k NNs for any point of Rw, they might be
k NNs for a point outside Rw with a confidence level at least cl. In addition, some data objects,
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Figure 5: (a) CL(q, p2), (b) GR(cl, p2) and (c) GCR(cl, k)
which are the k NNs for some portions of Rw, can be also the k NNs from locations outside of Rw
with a confidence level at least cl. For example for cl = 0.5 and k = 1, Figure 5(a) shows that a
point q, located outside Rw, has a confidence level2 greater than 0.5 for its nearest data object p2.
On the other hand, from a data object’s viewpoint, Figure 5(b) shows two regions surrounding a
data object p2, where for any point inside these regions a user has a confidence level at least 0.90,
and 0.50, respectively for p23. We call such a region guaranteed region, denoted asGR(cl, ph) with
respect to a data object ph for a specific confidence level cl. We define GR(cl, ph) as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Guaranteed region) Let C(o, r) be the known region, P the set of data objects in
C(o, r), ph a data object in P , and cl the confidence level. The guaranteed region with respect to
ph, GR(cl, ph), is the set of all points such that {CL(q, ph) ≥ cl} for any point q ∈ GR(cl, ph).
From the guaranteed region of every data object in P we compute the guaranteed combined
region, denoted as GCR(cl, k), where for any point in this region a user has at least k data objects
with a confidence level at least cl. Figure 5(c) shows an example, where P = {p1, p2, p3} and cl =
0.5. Then for k = 1, the black bold line shows the boundary of GCR(0.5, 1), which is the union
of GR(0.5, p1), GR(0.5, p2) and GR(0.5, p3). For k = 2, the ash bold line shows the boundary
of GCR(0.5, 2), which is the union of GR(0.5, p1)∩GR(0.5, p2), GR(0.5, p2)∩GR(0.5, p3) and
GR(0.5, p3) ∩GR(0.5, p1). We define GCR(cl, k) as follows.
Definition 6.2 (Guaranteed combined region) Let C(o, r) be the known region, P the set of data
objects in C(o, r), ph a data object in P , cl the confidence level, k the number of data objects, and
GR(cl, ph) the guaranteed region. The guaranteed combined region, GCR(cl, k), is the union of
the regions where at least k GR(ph, cl) overlap, i.e., ∪P ′⊆P∧|P ′|=k{∩h∈P ′GR(ph, cl)}.
Since for any point in GCR(cl, k), a user has at least k data objects with a confidence level at
least cl, the following lemma shows that for any point in GCR(cl, k) the user also has the k NNs
with a confidence level at least cl.
2The confidence level of any point represents the confidence level of a user located at that point.
3Note that, whenever we mention the confidence level of a point for a data object then the data object can be any
of the jth NN from that point, where 1 ≤ j ≤ |P |.
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Lemma 6.1 If the confidence level of a user located at q is at least cl for any k data objects, then
the confidence level of the user is also at least cl for the k NNs from q.
Proof. (By contradiction) Assume to the contrary that for the user at q has a confidence level less
than cl for the ith NN among the data objects, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We know that the user at q has
k data objects with at least confidence level cl. According to the assumption these k data objects
must not be the user’s k NNs; at least one of them, say p1, is at a greater distance than the kth NN
from q. But according to Definition 5.1, we know that the confidence level of the user for the jth
NN is greater than the (j + 1)th NN for 1 ≤ j ≤ |P | − 1. This implies that since CL(q, p1) ≥ cl
and p1 is located farther than the k NNs from q, the user has a confidence level at least cl for the k
NNs, which contradicts our assumption.
In our technique, the moving user can use the retrieved data objects from the outside of Rw and
delay the next request with a new obfuscation rectangle Rw+1 until the user leaves GCR(cl, k).
Although delaying the next request with Rw+1 in this way may allow a user to avoid an overlap of
Rw and Rw+1, the threat to trajectory privacy is still in place. Since the LSP can also compute
GCR(cl, k), similar to the overlapping rectangle attack, the user’s location can be computed
more precisely by the LSP from the overlap of the new obfuscation rectangle Rw+1 and current
GCR(cl, k) (see Figure 6(a) for GCR(0.5, k) ∩Rw+1).
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Figure 6: (a) An attack from Rw+1 ∩ GCR(0.5, 1), (b)-(d) Removal of attacks with clr = 0.5 and
cl = 0.9
To overcome the above mentioned attack and the overlapping rectangle attack, the key idea
of our technique is to increase the size of GCR without informing the LSP about this extended
region. To achieve the extended region of GCR without informing the LSP, the user has three
options while requesting a PMkNN query: the user specifies a higher value than (i) the required
confidence level or (ii) the required number of nearest data objects or (iii) both. It is important to
note that the user does not reveal the required confidence level and the required number of NNs to
the LSP. Let clr and kr represent the required confidence level and the required number of NNs for
a user, respectively, and cl and k represent the specified confidence level and the specified number
of NNs to the LSP by the user, respectively.
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Consider the first option, where a user specifies a higher value than the required confidence
level, i.e., cl > clr. We know that the GCR is constructed from GRs of data objects in P and the
GR of a data object becomes smaller with the increase of the confidence level for a fixed C(o, r)
as shown in Figure 5(b), which justifies the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2 Let cl > clr and k = kr. Then GCR(clr, kr) ⊃ GCR(cl, k) for a fixed C(o, r).
Since GCR(clr, kr) ⊃ GCR(cl, k), now the user can delay the next request with a new
obfuscation rectangleRw+1 until the user leavesGCR(clr, kr). Since the LSP does not know about
GCR(clr, kr), it is not possible for the LSP to find more precise trajectory path from the overlap
of GCR(clr, kr) and Rw+1. Figure 6(b) shows an example for k = 1, where a user’s required
confidence level is clr = 0.5 and the specified confidence level is cl = 0.9. The LSP does not
know about the boundary of GCR(0.5, 1) and thus cannot find the user’s precise location from the
overlap of GCR(0.5, 1) and Rw+1.
However, the next location update Rw+1 has to be in C(o, r) of Rw. Otherwise, the LSP is
able to determine more precise location of the user as Rw+1 ∩ C(o, r) at the time of requesting
Rw+1. For any location outside C(o, r), the user has a confidence level 0 which in turn means that
q cannot be within the region of Rw+1 that falls outside C(o, r) at the time of requesting Rw+1. As
a result whenever C(o, r) is small, then the restriction might cause a large part of Rw+1 to overlap
with GCR(cl, k) and Rw. The advantage of our technique is that this overlap does not cause any
privacy threat for the user’s trajectory due to the availability of GCR(clr, kr) to the user. Since
there is no guarantee that the user’s trajectory passes through the overlap or not, the LSP is not
able to determine the user’s precise trajectory path from the overlap of Rw+1 with GCR(cl, k) and
Rw. Without loss of generality, Figures 6(c) and 6(d) show two examples, where Rw+1 overlaps
withGCR(0.9, 1) for clr = 0.5, cl = 0.9, and k = 1. In Figure 6(c) we see that the user’s trajectory
does not pass through GCR(0.9, 1) ∩ Rw+1, whereas Figure 6(d) shows a case, where the user’s
trajectory passes through the overlap.
Another possible threat on the user’s trajectory privacy could arise if Rw+1 overlaps with
GCR(cl, k) and Rw. A user does not need to send the next request with Rw+1 as long as the user is
in GCR(clr, kr) which in turn means the user’s location must not be within GCR(clr, kr) ∩Rw+1
at the time of sending Rw+1 to the LSP. Since the LSP does not know GCR(clr, kr), the LSP
cannot identify the overlap of GCR(clr, kr) with Rw+1 and determine more precise location of the
user as Rw+1 \ (GCR(clr, kr) ∩ Rw+1). However consider the case when Rw+1 overlaps with
GCR(cl, k) and Rw: since GCR(cl, k), Rw ⊂ GCR(clr, kr) and the LSP knows GCR(cl, k)
and Rw, the LSP can refine more precise location of the user at the time of sending Rw+1 as
Rw+1 \ (GCR(cl, k) ∩ Rw+1). To overcome the above mentioned privacy threat, we use two
variables δb and δ:
• Boundary distance δb: the minimum distance of user’s current position q from the boundary
of C(o, r).
• Safe distance δ: the user specified distance, which is used to determine when the next request
needs to be sent.
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In our technique, the user’s next request is sent to the LSP as soon as δb becomes less or equal
to δ. Using δ, whose value is unknown to the LSP, there is no possible privacy attack from the
overlap of Rw+1 with GCR(cl, k) and Rw as the user might need to send Rw+1 in advance due to
the constraint of δb ≤ δ. Figure 6(d) shows a case where the user’s location at the time of requesting
Rw+1 is within GCR(0.9, 1) ∩Rw+1 to satisfy δb ≤ δ.
In the second option of achieving the extended region of GCR without informing the LSP, a
user specifies a higher value than the required number of NNs, i.e., k > kr. From the construction
method of a GCR, we know that GCR(cl, k + 1) ⊂ GCR(cl, k) for a fixed C(o, r), which leads
to the following lemma.
Lemma 6.3 Let cl = clr and k > kr. Then GCR(clr, kr) ⊃ GCR(cl, k) for a fixed C(o, r).
Since we also have GCR(clr, kr) ⊃ GCR(cl, k) for the second option, similar to the case of
first option, a user can protect her trajectory privacy using the extended region, which is used when
the user cannot sacrifice the accuracy of answers.
In the third option, a user requests higher values for both confidence level and the number
of NNs than required and can obtain a larger extension for the GCR(clr, kr) as both cl and k
contribute to extend the region. The larger extension ensures a user with a higher level of trajectory
privacy because GCR(clr, kr) covers a longer part of the user’s trajectory, which in turn reduces
the number of times the user needs to send the obfuscation rectangle. The level of trajectory privacy
also increases with the increase of the difference between cl and clr or k and kr because with the
decrease of clr or kr, the size of GCR(clr, kr) increases for a fixed C(o, r) and with the increase
of cl or k, C(o, r) becomes larger, which results in a larger GCR(clr, kr). Thus, the difference
between cl and clr or k and kr can be increased by either incurring a higher query processing
overhead (i.e., specifying a higher value for cl or k) or sacrificing the required quality of the
answers (i.e., specifying a lower value for clr or kr). Note that, a large value for cl or k incurs
higher query processing overhead as more data objects need to be retrieved.
The parameters cl, clr, k, kr, δ, and the size of the obfuscation rectangle can be changed
according to the user’s privacy profile and quality of service requirements. A user can specify
a high level of privacy requirement in her profile for some locations that are more sensitive to her.
Different values for cl, clr, k, kr, and δ in consecutive requests prevent an LSP from gradually
learning or guessing any bound of clr and kr to apply reverse engineering and predict a more
precise user location within the obfuscation rectangle.
Based on the above discussion of our technique, we present the algorithm that protects the
user’s trajectory privacy while processing an MkNN query. Before going to the details of the
algorithm, we summarize commonly used symbols in Table 1.
6.1 Algorithm
Algorithm 1, REQUEST PMkNN, shows the steps for requesting a PMkNN query. A user initiates
an MkNN query by generating an obfuscation rectangle Rw that includes her current location q.
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Symbol Meaning
Rw Obfuscation Rectangle
clr Required confidence level
cl Specified confidence level
kr Required number of NNs
k Specified number of NNs
C(o, r) Known region
GCR(., .) Guaranteed combined region
δ Safe distance
δb Boundary distance
Table 1: Symbols
The parameters cl, clr, k, kr, and δ are set according to the user’s requirement. Then a request is sent
with Rw to the LSP for k NNs with a confidence level cl. The LSP returns the set of data objects P
that includes the k NNs for every point of Rw with a confidence level at least cl. Then according
to Lemma 6.1, the user continues to have the kr NNs with a confidence level at least clr as long
as the user resides within GCR(clr, kr). In this paper, we do not focus on developing algorithms
to maintain the rank of kr NNs from P for every position of the user’s trajectory, because this is
orthogonal to our problem of protecting privacy of users’ trajectories for an MkNN query. For this
purpose, any of the existing approaches (e.g., [29]) can be used.
For every location update, the algorithm checks two conditions: whether the user’s current
position q is outside her current GCR(clr, kr) or the minimum boundary distance from C(o, r), δb,
has become less or equal to the user specified distance, δ. To check whether the user is outside her
GCR(clr, kr), the algorithm checks the constraint r ≤ clr×dist(phk, q)+dist(o, q), where r is the
radius of current known region and clr × dist(phk, q) + dist(o, q) represents the required radius of
the known region to have kr NNs with confidence level at least clr from the current position q. For
the second condition, δb is computed by subtracting dist(o, q) from r (Line 1.13). If any of the two
conditions in Line 1.14 becomes true, then the new obfuscation rectangle Rw+1 is computed with
the restriction that it must be included within the current C(o, r). After computing Rw+1, the next
request is sent and k NNs are retrieved for Rw+1 with a confidence level at least cl. The process
continues as long as the service is required.
The function GenerateRectangle is used to compute an obfuscation rectangle for a user
according to her privacy requirement. We assume that a user can compute her rectangle based on
any existing obfuscation or l-diversity techniques [10, 38, 40] and therefore a detailed discussion
for the function GenerateRectangle goes beyond the scope of this paper.
The following theorem shows the correctness of the algorithm REQUEST PMkNN.
Theorem 6.4 The algorithm REQUEST PMkNN protects a user’s trajectory privacy for MkNN
queries.
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Algorithm 1: REQUEST PMkNN
w ← 11.1
cl, clr ← user specified and required confidence level1.2
k, kr ← user specified and required number of NNs1.3
δ ← user specified safe distance1.4
Rw ← GenerateRectangle(q)1.5
P ← RequestkNN(Rw, cl, k)1.6
while service required do1.7
q ← NextLocationUpdate()1.8
phk ← krth NN from q1.9
cl, clr ← user specified and required confidence level1.10
k, kr ← user specified and required number of NNs1.11
δ ← user specified safe distance1.12
δb ← r − dist(o, q)1.13
if (r ≤ clr × dist(phk, q) + dist(o, q)) or (δb ≤ δ) then1.14
Rw+1 ← GenerateRectangle(q, C(o, r))1.15
P ← RequestkNN(Rw+1, cl, k)1.16
w ← w + 11.17
Proof.
The obfuscation rectangles Rw+1 for a user requesting a PMkNN query always overlaps with
GCR(clr, kr) and sometimes also overlaps with GCR(cl, k) and Rw. We will show that these
overlaps do not reveal a more precise user location to the LSP, i.e., the user’s trajectory privacy is
protected.
The LSP does not know about the boundary of GCR(clr, kr), which means that the LSP
cannot compute GCR(clr, kr)∩Rw+1. Thus, the LSP cannot refine a user’s location at the time of
requesting Rw+1 or the user’s trajectory path from GCR(clr, kr) ∩Rw+1.
Since the LSP knows GCR(cl, k) and Rw, it can compute the overlaps, GCR(cl, k) ∩ Rw+1
and Rw ∩Rw+1, when it receives Rw+1. However, the availability of GCR(clr, kr) to the user and
the option of having different values for δ prevent the LSP to determine whether the user is located
within GCR(cl, k) ∩ Rw+1 and Rw ∩ Rw+1 at the time of requesting Rw+1 or whether the user’s
trajectory passes through these overlaps.
In summary there is no additional information to render a more precise user position or user
trajectory within the rectangle. Thus, every obfuscation rectangle computed using the algorithm
REQUEST PMkNN satisfies the two required conditions (see Definition 2.3) for protecting a user’s
trajectory privacy.
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6.1.1 The maximum movement bound attack
As we have discussed in Section 2, if a user’s maximum velocity is known to the LSP then the
maximum movement bounding attack can identify a user’s more precise position. To prevent the
maximum movement bound attack, existing solutions [6, 15, 26, 35] have proposed that Rw+1 for
the next request needs to be computed in a way so that Rw+1 is completely included within the
maximum movement bound of Rw, denoted as Mw. Our proposed algorithm to generate Rw+1
can also consider this constraint of Mw whenever the LSP knows the user’s maximum velocity.
Incorporating the constraint of Mw in our algorithm does not cause any new privacy violation for
users.
Note that, Algorithm 1 to protect a user’s trajectory privacy for an MkNN query with
obfuscation rectangles can be also generalized for the case where a user uses other geometric
shapes (e.g., a circle) to represent the imprecise locations if the known region for other geometric
shapes is also a circle. For example, if a user uses obfuscation circles instead of obfuscation
rectangles then the overlapping rectangle attack turns into overlapping circle attack. From
Algorithm 1, we observe that our technique to protect overlapping rectangle attack is independent
of any parameter of obfuscation rectangle; it only depends on the center and radius of the known
region. Thus, as long as the representation of the known region is a circle, our technique can be
also applied for an overlapping circle attack.
7 Server-side Processing
For a PMkNN query with a customizable confidence level, an LSP needs to provide the k NNs with
the specified confidence level for all points of every requested obfuscation rectangle. Evaluating
the k NNs with a specified confidence level for every point of an obfuscation rectangle separately
is an expensive operation and doing it continuously for a PMkNN query incurs large overhead.
In this section, we develop an efficient algorithm that finds the k NNs for every point of an
obfuscation rectangle with a specified confidence level in a single search using an R-tree. Our
proposed algorithm allows an LSP to provide the user with a known region, which helps protecting
the user’s trajectory privacy and further to reduce the overall PMkNN query processing overhead.
We show different properties of a confidence level for an obfuscation rectangle, which we
use to improve the efficiency of our algorithms. Let Rw be a user’s obfuscation rectangle with
center o and corner points {c1, c2, c3, c4}, and mij be the middle point of cicj , where (i, j) ∈
{(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 1)}. To avoid the computation of the confidence level for a data object
with respect to every point of Rw while searching for the query answers, we exploit the following
properties of the confidence level. We show that if two endpoints, i.e., a corner point and its
adjacent middle point or the center and a point in the border of Rw, of a line have a confidence
level at least cl for a data object then every point of the line has a confidence level at least cl for
that data object. Formally, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 7.1 Let ci, cj be any two adjacent corner points of an obfuscation rectangle Rw and mij
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be the middle point of cicj . For t ∈ {i, j}, if ct and mij have a confidence level at least cl for a
data object ph then all points in mijct have a confidence level at least cl for ph.
Theorem 7.2 Let o be the center of an obfuscation rectangleRw, ci, cj be any two adjacent corner
points of Rw, and c be a point in cicj . If o and c have a confidence level at least cl for a data object
ph then all points in oc have a confidence level at least cl for ph.
Next we discuss the proof of Theorem 7.1. We omit the proof of Theorem 7.2, since a similar
proof technique used for Theorem 7.1 can be applied for Theorem 7.2 by considering o as mij and
c as ct.
As mentioned in Section 5, our algorithm to evaluate kNN answers expands the known region
C(o, r) until the k NNs with the specified confidence level for every point of Rw are found. Since
any point outside C(o, r) has a confidence level 0 (see Definition 5.1), C(o, r) needs to be at least
expanded untilR is within C(o, r) to ensure kNN answers with a specified confidence level greater
than 0. Hence, we assume that R ⊂ C(o, r) at the current state of the search. Let the extended
lines −−→omij4 and −→oct intersect the border of C(o, r) at m′ij and c′t, respectively, where t ∈ {i, j}.
Figure 7(a) shows an example for i = 1, j = 2, and t = j. For a data object ph in C(o, r), the
confidence levels of ct and mij , CL(ct, ph) and CL(mij, ph), can be expressed as
dist(ct,ct′)
dist(ct,ph)
and
dist(mij ,mij
′)
dist(mij ,ph)
, respectively.
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Figure 7: Impact of different positions of a data object
Let x be a point in mijct, and −→ox intersect the border of C(o, r) at x′. For a data object ph in
C(o, r), the confidence level of x, CL(x, ph), is measured as
dist(x,x′)
dist(x,ph)
. As x moves from ct towards
mij , although dist(x, x′) always increases, dist(x, ph) can increase or decrease (does not maintain
a single trend) since it depends on the position of ph within C(o, r). Without loss of generality we
consider an example in Figure 7, where p1 is a data object within C(o, r). Based on the position
of p1 with respect to m12 and c2, we have three cases: the perpendicular from p1 intersects the
4We use the symbol→ for directional line segments.
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extended line −−−→c2m12 (see Figure 7(a)) or the extended line −−−→m12c2 (see Figure 7(b)) or the segment
m12c2 (see Figure 7(c)) at l2. In the first case, dist(x, p1) decreases as xmoves from c2 towardsm12
as shown in Figure 7(a). In the second case, dist(x, p1) decreases as x moves from m12 towards
c2 as shown in Figure 7(b). In the third case, dist(x, ph) is the minimum at x = l2, i.e., dist(x, p1)
decreases as xmoves from c2 orm12 towards l2 as shown in Figure 7(c). From these three cases we
observe that for different positions of ph, dist(x, ph) can decrease for moving x in both directions,
i.e., from ct towards mij or from mij towards ct.
For the scenario, where dist(x, ph) decreases as x moves from ct towards mij (first case) or
from ct towards lt (third case), i.e., dist(x, ph) ≤ dist(ct, ph), we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3 If dist(x, ph) ≤ dist(ct, ph) and CL(ct, ph) ≥ cl then CL(x, ph) ≥ cl, for any point
x ∈ mijct.
The proof of this lemma directly follows from dist(x, x′) ≥ dist(ct, ct′).
In the other scenario, dist(x, ph) decreases as x moves from mij towards ct (second case)
or from mij towards lt (third case). In the general case, let ut be a point that represents ct for the
second case and lt for the third case. To prove that CL(x, ph) ≥ cl, in contrast to Lemma 7.3 where
we only need to have CL(ct, ph) ≥ cl, for the current scenario we need to have the confidence level
at least equal to cl for ph at both end points, i.e., mij and ut. According to the given conditions of
Theorem 7.1, we already have CL(mij, ph) ≥ cl and CL(ct, ph) ≥ cl. Since ut is ct in the second
case and lt in the third case, we need to compute the confidence level of lt for ph in the third case
and using Lemma 7.3 we find that CL(lt, ph) ≥ cl. Thus, we have the confidence level of both mij
and ut for ph at least equal to cl.
However, showing CL(x, ph) ≥ cl if both mij and ut have a confidence level of at least cl for
ph is not straightforward, because in the current scenario both dist(x, ph) and dist(x, x′) decrease
with the increase of dist(mij, x). Thus, we need to compare the rate of decrease for dist(x, x′) and
dist(x, ph) as x moves from mij to ut. Assume that ∠xomij = θx and ∠phxlt = αx. The range of
θx can vary from 0 to θ, where θmij = 0, θut = θ, and θ ≤ Π4 . For a fixed range of θx the range
of αx, [αmij , αut ], can have any range from [0,
Π
2
] depending upon the position of ph. We express
dist(x, x′) and dist(x, ph) as follows:
dist(x, x′) = r − dist(o,mij)× sec θx
dist(x, ph) =
{
dist(ph, lt)× cscαx if αx 6= 0
dist(mij, ph)− dist(mij, x) otherwise.
The rate of decrease for dist(x, x′) and dist(x, ph) are not comparable by computing their first
order derivative as they are expressed with different variables and there is no fixed relation between
the range of θx and αx. Therefore, we perform a curve sketching and consider the second order
derivative in Figure 8. From the second order derivative, we observe in Figure 8(a) that the rate
of decreasing rate of dist(x, x′) increases with the increase of θx, whereas in Figure 8(b) the rate
of decreasing rate of dist(x, ph) decreases with the increase of αx for αx 6= 0 and in Figure 8(c)
the rate of decreasing rate remains constant with the increase of dist(mij, x) for αx = 0. The
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Figure 8: Curve sketching
different trends of the decreasing rate and the constraint of confidence levels at two end points
mij and ut allow us to make a qualitative comparison between the rate of decrease for dist(x, x′)
and dist(x, ph) with respect to the common metric dist(mij, x), as dist(mij, x) increases with the
increase of both θx and αx for a fixed ph. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 7.4 Let dist(x, ph) decrease as x moves from mij to ut for any point x ∈ mijut. If
CL(mij, ph) ≥ cl and CL(ut, ph) ≥ cl, then CL(x, ph) ≥ cl.
Proof. (By contradiction) Assume to the contrary that there is a point x ∈ mijut such that
CL(x, ph) < cl, i.e.,
dist(x,x′)
dist(x,ph)
< cl. Then we have the following relations.
dist(mij,m
′
ij)− dist(x, x′)
dist(mij, x)
>
dist(mij, ph)− dist(x, ph)
dist(mij, x)
(1)
dist(x, x′)− dist(ut, u′t)
dist(x, ut)
<
dist(x, ph)− dist(ut, ph)
dist(x, ut)
(2)
Since we know that for dist(x, x′), the rate of decreasing rate increases with the increase of
dist(mij, x) and for dist(x, ph), the rate of decreasing rate decreases or remains constant with
the increase of dist(mij, x), we have the following relations.
dist(mij,m
′
ij)− dist(x, x′)
dist(mij, x)
<
dist(x, x′)− dist(ut, u′t)
dist(x, ut)
(3)
dist(mij, ph)− dist(x, ph)
dist(mij, x)
≥ dist(x, ph)− dist(ut, ph)
dist(x, ut)
(4)
¿From Equations 1, 2, and 3 we have,
dist(mij, ph)− dist(x, ph)
dist(mij, x)
<
dist(x, ph)− dist(ut, ph)
dist(x, ut)
which contradicts Equation 4, i.e., our assumption.
Finally, from Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4, we can conclude that if CL(ct, ph) ≥ cl and CL(mij, ph) ≥
cl, then CL(x, ph) ≥ cl for any point x ∈ mijct, which proves Theorem 7.1.
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7.1 Algorithms
We develop an efficient algorithm, CLAPPINQ (Confidence Level Aware Privacy Protection In
Nearest Neighbor Queries), that finds the k NNs for an obfuscation rectangle with a specified
confidence level. Algorithm 2 gives the pseudo code for CLAPPINQ using an R-tree. The input to
Algorithm 2 are an obfuscation rectangle Rw, a confidence level cl, and the number of NNs k and
the output is the candidate answer set P that includes the k NNs with a confidence level at least cl
for every point of Rw.
Algorithm 2: CLAPPINQ(R, cl, k)
P ← ∅2.1
status← 02.2
Enqueue(Qp, root, 0)2.3
while Qp is not empty and status ≥ 0 do2.4
p← Dequeue(Qp)2.5
r ←MinDist(o, p)2.6
if status > 0 and status < r then2.7
status← −12.8
if p is a data object then2.9
P ← P ∪ p2.10
if status = 0 then2.11
status← UpdateStatus(R, cl, k, P, r)2.12
else2.13
for each child node pc of p do2.14
dmin(pc)←MinDist(o, pc)2.15
Enqueue(Qp, pc, dmin(pc))2.16
return P ;2.17
As mentioned in Section 5, the basic idea of our algorithm is to start a best first search (BFS)
considering the center o of the given obfuscation rectangle Rw as the query point and continue the
search until the k NNs with a confidence level of at least cl are found for all points of Rw. The
known region C(o, r) is the search region covered by BFS and P is the set of data objects located
within C(o, r). Qp is a priority queue used to maintain the ordered data objects and R-tree nodes
based on the minimum distance between the query point o and the data objects/MBRs of R-tree
nodes (by using the function MinDist). Since the size of the candidate answer set is unknown,
we use status to control the execution of the BFS. Based on the values of status, the BFS can
have three states: (i) when status = 0, each time the BFS discovers the next nearest data object,
it checks whether status needs to be updated, (ii) when status > 0, the BFS executes until the
radius of the known region becomes greater than the value of status, and (iii) when status = −1,
the BFS terminates. Initially, status is set to 0. Each time a data object/R-tree node p is dequeued
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from Qp the current radius r is updated. When p represents a data object, then p is added to the
current candidate set P and the procedure UpdateStatus is called if status equals 0.
The pseudo code for UpdateStatus is shown in Algorithm 3. The notations used for this
algorithm are summarized below.
1. count(ct, cl, P ): the number of data objects in P for which a corner point ct of Rw has a
confidence level at least cl.
2. dki (d
k
j ): the k
th minimum distance from a middle point mij of Rw to the data objects in Pi
(Pj), where Pi (Pj) ⊂ P and Pi (Pj) is the set of data objects with respect to ci (cj) with a
confidence level of at least cl.
3. dmax: the maximum of all dmax(mij), where each dmax(mij) is the maximum of dki and d
k
j
(see Figure 9(a)).
4. dsafe: the minimum distance of all dsafe(mij), where dsafe(mij) represents the radius of the
maximum circular region within C(o, r) centered at mij (see Figure 9(b)).
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Figure 9: (a) dmax = dmax(m23) and (b) dsafe = dsafe(m23)
UpdateStatus first updates count(ct, cl, P ) using the function UpdateCount. For each p ∈ P ,
UpdateCount increments count(ct, cl, P ) by one if CL(ct, p) >= cl. Note that corner points of
Rw can have more than k data objects with confidence level at least cl because the increase of r
for a corner point of Rw can make other corner points to have more than k data objects with a
confidence level at least cl. In the next step if count(ct, cl, P ) is less than k for any corner point ct
of Rw, UpdateStatus returns the control to Algorithm 2 without changing status. Otherwise, it
computes the radius of the required known region for ensuring the k NNs with respect toRw and cl
(Lines 3.5-3.16). For eachmij , UpdateStatus first computes dki and d
k
j with the functionKmin and
takes the maximum of dki and d
k
j as dmax(mij). Then UpdateStatus finds dmax (Lines 3.10-3.11)
and dsafe (Line 3.12). Finally, UpdateStatus checks if the size of the current C(o, r) is already
equal or greater than the required size. If this is the case then the algorithm returns status as -1,
otherwise the value of the radius for the required known region. After the call of UpdateStatus,
CLAPPINQ continues the BFS if status ≥ 0 and terminates if status = −1. For status greater
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than 0, each time a next nearest data object/MBR is found, CLAPPINQ updates status to −1 if r
becomes greater than status (Lines 2.7-2.8).
Algorithm 3: UpdateStatus(R, cl, k, P, r)
UpdateCount(R, cl, k, P, r, count)3.1
if count(ct, cl, P ) 6= k, for any corner point ct ∈ R then3.2
return 03.3
else3.4
dmax ← 03.5
for each middle point mi,j do3.6
dki ← Kmin(mij, ci, cl, k, P )3.7
dkj ← Kmin(mij, cj, cl, k, P )3.8
dmax(mij)← max{dki , dkj}3.9
if dmax(mij) > dmax then3.10
dmax ← dmax(mij)3.11
dsafe ← r − 12 ×max{|c1c2|, |c2c3|}3.12
if cl × dmax > dsafe then3.13
return (r + cl × dmax − dsafe)3.14
else3.15
return −13.16
In summary, CLAPPINQ works in three steps. In step 1, it runs the BFS from o until it finds the
k NNs with a confidence level of at least cl for all corner points of Rw. In step 2, from the current
set of data objects it computes the radius of the required known region to confirm that the answer
set includes the k NNs with a confidence level of at least cl with respect to all points ofRw. Finally,
in step 3, it continues to run the BFS until the radius of the current known region is equal to the
required size.
Figure 10 shows an example of the execution of CLAPPINQ for k = 1 and cl = 1. Data objects
are labeled in order of the increasing distance from o. CLAPPINQ starts its search from o and
continues until the NNs with respect to four corner points are found as shown in Figure 10(a). The
circles with ash border show the continuous expanding of the known region and the circle with
black border represents the current known region. The data objects p4, p7, p5, and p3 are the NNs
with cl = 1 from c1, c2, c3, and c4, respectively because the four circles with a dashed border are
completely within the known region. In the next step, the algorithm finds the maximum of dki and
dkj for each mij . The distances d
1
2 (=dist(m12, p7)), d
1
2 (=dist(m12, p7)) (or d
1
3 (=dist(m23, p5))), d
1
4
(=dist(m34, p3)), d11 (=dist(m41, p4)) are the maximum with respect to m12, m23, m34, and m41,
respectively. Finally, CLAPPINQ expands the search so that the four circles with dashed border
centered at m12, m23, m34, and m41 and having radius d12, d
1
2 (or d
1
3), d
1
4, and d
1
1, respectively, are
included in the known region (see Figure 10(b)). Therefore, the search stops when p9 is discovered
and P includes p1 to p9.
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Figure 10: Steps of CLAPPINQ: an example for k = 1 and cl = 1
The following theorem shows the correctness for CLAPPINQ.
Theorem 7.5 CLAPPINQ returns P , a candidate set of data objects that includes the k NNs with
a confidence level at least cl for every point of the obfuscation rectangle Rw.
Proof. CLAPPINQ expands the known region C(o, r) from the center o of the obfuscation
rectangle Rw until it finds the k NNs with a confidence level at least cl for all corner points of
Rw. Then it extends C(o, r) to ensure that the confidence level of each middle point mij is at least
cl for both sets of k nearest data objects for which ci and cj have a confidence level at least cl.
According to Theorem 7.1, this ensures that any point in mijci or mijcj has a confidence level at
least cl for k data objects. Again from Lemma 6.1, we know that if a point has k data objects with
a confidence level at least cl then it also has a confidence level at least cl for its k NNs. Thus, P
contains the k NNs with a confidence level at least cl for all points of the border of Rw.
To complete the proof, next we need to show that P also contains the k nearest data objects
with a confidence level at least cl for all points inside Rw. The confidence level of the center o of
Rw for a data object ph within the known region C(o, r) is always 1 because C(o, r) is expanded
from o and we have dist(o, ph) ≤ r. Since we have already shown that P includes the k NNs
with a confidence level at least cl for all points of the border of Rw, according to Theorem 7.1 and
Lemma 6.1, P also includes the k NNs with a confidence level at least cl for all points inside Rw.
We have proposed the fundamental algorithm and there are many possible optimizations
of it. For example, one optimization could merge overlapping obfuscation rectangles requested
by different users at the same time, which will also avoid redundant computation. Another
optimization could exploit that Rw and Rw+1 may have many overlapping NNs. However, the
focus of this paper is protecting trajectory privacy of users while answering MkNN queries, and
exploring all possible optimizations of the algorithm is beyond the scope of this paper.
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8 Experiments
In this section, we present an extensive experimental evaluation of our proposed approach. In
our experiments, we use both synthetic and real data sets. Our two synthetic data sets are
generated from uniform (U) and Zipfian (Z) distribution, respectively. The synthetic data sets
contain locations of 20,000 data objects and the real data set contains 62,556 postal addresses
from California. These data objects are indexed using an R∗-tree [3] on a server (the LSP). We run
all of our experiments on a desktop with a Pentium 2.40 GHz CPU and 2 GByte RAM.
In Section 8.1, we evaluate the efficiency of our proposed algorithm, CLAPPINQ, to find k NNs
with a specified confidence level for an obfuscation rectangle. We measure the query evaluation
time, I/Os, and the candidate answer set size as the performance metric. In Section 8.2, we evaluate
the effectiveness of our technique for preserving trajectory privacy for MkNN queries.
Parameter Range Default
Obfuscation rectangle area 0.001% to 0.01% 0.005%
Obfuscation rectangle ratio 1, 2, 4, 8 1
Specified confidence level cl 0.5 to 1 1
Specified number of NNs k 1 to 20 1
Synthetic data set size 5K, 10K, 15K, 20K 20K
Table 2: Experimental Setup
8.1 kNN queries with respect to an obfuscation rectangle
There is no existing algorithm to process a PMkNN query. An essential component of our approach
for a PMkNN query is an algorithm to evaluate a kNN query with respect to an obfuscation
rectangle. In this set of experiments we compare our proposed kNN algorithm, CLAPPINQ, with
Casper [31], because Casper is the only existing related algorithm that can be adapted to process
a PMkNN query; further, even if we adapt it can only support k = 1. To be more specific, our
privacy aware approach for MkNN queries needs an algorithm that returns the known region in
addition to the set of k NNs with respect to an obfuscation rectangle. Among all existing kNN
algorithms [9, 8, 25, 27, 31, 35] only Casper supports the known region and if Casper were as
efficient as CLAPPINQ, then we could extend Casper for PMkNN queries for the restricted case
k = 1.
We set the data space as 10,000 × 10,000 square units. For each set of experiments in this
section, we generate 1000 random obfuscation rectangles of a specified area, which are uniformly
distributed in the total data space. We evaluate a kNN query with respect to 1000 obfuscation
rectangles and measure the average performance with respect to a single obfuscation rectangle for
Casper and CLAPPINQ in terms of the query evaluation time, the number of page accesses, i.e.,
I/Os, and the candidate answer set size. The page size is set to 1 KB which corresponds to a node
capacity of 50 entries.
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Note that, in our experiments, the communication amount (i.e., the answer set size) represents
the communication cost independent of communication link (e.g., wireless LANs, cellular
link) used. The communication delay can be approximated from the known latency of the
communication link. In our technique, sometimes the answer set size may become large to satisfy
the user’s privacy requirement. Though the large answer set size may result in a communication
delay, nowadays this should not be a problem. The latency of wireless links has been significantly
reduced, for example HSPA+ offers a latency as low as 10ms. Furthermore, our analysis represents
the communication delay scenario in the worst case. In practice, the latency of first packet is higher
than the subsequent packets and thus, the communication delay does not increase linearly with the
increase of the answer set size. In different sets of experiments, we vary the following parameters:
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Figure 11: The effect of obfuscation rectangle area and ratio
the area of the obfuscation rectangle, the ratio of the length and width of the obfuscation rectangle,
the specified confidence level, the specified number of NNs and the synthetic data set size. Table 2
shows the range and default value for each of these parameters. We set 0.005% of the total data
29
space as the default area for the obfuscation rectangle, since it reflects a small suburb in California
(about 20 km2 with respect to the total area of California) and is sufficient to protect privacy of a
user’s location. The thinner an obfuscation rectangle, the higher the probability to identify a user’s
trajectory [12]. Hence, we set 1 as a default value for the ratio of the obfuscation rectangle to ensure
the privacy of the user. The original approach of Casper does not have the concept of confidence
level and only addresses 1NN queries. To compare our approach with Casper, we set the default
value in CLAPPINQ for k and the confidence level as 1.
In Sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2, we evaluate and compare CLAPPINQ with Casper. In Section 8.1.3,
we study the impact of k and the confidence level only for CLAPPINQ as Casper cannot be directly
applied for k > 1 and has no concept of a confidence level.
8.1.1 The effect of obfuscation rectangle area
In this set of experiments, we vary the area of obfuscation rectangle from 0.001% to 0.01% of the
total data space. A larger obfuscation rectangle represents a more imprecise location of the user
and thus ensures a higher level of privacy. We also vary the obfuscation rectangle ratio as 1,2,4,
and 8. A smaller ratio of the width and length of the obfuscation rectangle provides the user with a
higher level of privacy.
Figures 11(a) and 11(b) show that CLAPPINQ is on an average 3times faster than Casper for
all data sets. The I/Os are also at least 3 times less than Casper (Figures 11(c) and 11(d)). The
difference between the answer set size for CLAPPINQ and Casper is not prominent. However,
in most of the cases CLAPPINQ results in a smaller answer set compared with that of Casper
(Figures 11(e) and 11(f)). We also observe that the performance is better when the obfuscation
rectangle is a square and it continues to degrade for a larger ratio in both CLAPPINQ and Casper
(Figures 11(b), 11(d), and 11(f)).
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Figure 12: The effect of data set size
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8.1.2 The effect of the data set size
We vary the size of the synthetic data set as 5K, 10K, 15K and 20K, and observe that CLAPPINQ
is significantly faster than that of Casper for any size of data set. Figure 12 shows the results for
the query evaluation time, I/Os and the answer set size. We find that CLAPPINQ is at least 3 times
faster and the I/Os of CLAPPINQ is at least 4 times less than that of Casper. The time, the I/Os and
the answer set size slowly increases with the increase of data set size.
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Figure 13: The effect of the parameter k and confidence level
8.1.3 The effect of k and the confidence level
In this set of experiments, we observe that the query evaluation time, I/Os, and the answer set size
for CLAPPINQ increase with the increase of k for all data sets. However, these increasing rates
decrease as k increases (Figure 13 for the California data set). We also vary the confidence level
cl and expect that a lower cl incurs less query processing and communication overhead. Figure 13
also shows that the average performance improves as cl decreases and the improvement is more
pronounced for higher values of cl. For example, the answer set size reduces by an average factor
of 2.35 and 1.37 when cl decreases from 1.00 to 0.75 and from 0.75 to 0.50, respectively.
8.1.4 CLAPPINQ vs. Casper for PMkNN queries
The paper that proposed Casper [31] did not address trajectory privacy for MkNN queries. Even if
we extend it for PMkNN queries using our technique, Casper would only work for k = 1. More
importantly, since we have found that CLAPPINQ is at least 2 times faster and requires at least 3
times less I/Os than Casper for finding the NNs for an obfuscation rectangle, and an MkNN query
requires the evaluation of a large number of consecutive obfuscation rectangles, CLAPPINQ would
outperform Casper by a greater margin for PMkNN queries. Therefore, we do not perform such
experiments and conclude that CLAPPINQ is efficient than Casper for PMkNN queries.
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8.2 Effectiveness of our technique for trajectory privacy protection
We first define a measure for trajectory privacy in Section 8.2.1. Then based on our measure, we
evaluate the effectiveness of our technique. In Section 8.2.2, we compare three possible options
of our algorithm REQUEST PMkNN for different obfuscation rectangle areas: (i) hiding the
required confidence level, (ii) hiding the required number of nearest data objects, and (iii) hiding
both of them. We report the experimental results for different required and specified confidence
levels in Section 8.2.3 and for different required and specified number of nearest data objects in
Section 8.2.4. We also present the experimental results by varying the value of δ in Section 8.2.5.
To simulate moving users, we first randomly generate starting points of 20 trajectories which
are uniformly distributed in the data space and then generate the complete trajectory for each of
these starting points. Each trajectory has the length of 5000 units and consists of a series of random
points, where the consecutive points are connected with a straight line of a random length between
1 to 10 units. Note that the data space is set as 10,000 × 10,000 square units. We generate the
obfuscation rectangle with a specified area when a moving user needs to send a request. Though
it is not always possible to have the ratio of the obfuscation rectangle’s length and width as 1, our
algorithm keeps the ratio as close as possible to 1: the obfuscation rectangle needs to be inside
the current known region; sometimes the user’s location is close to the boundary of the known
region and to include the user’s obfuscation rectangle inside the known region (circle), a ratio of
1 might not be possible. Therefore we adjust the ratio of the length and width of the obfuscation
rectangle to accommodate it within the known region.). Since the obfuscation rectangle generation
procedure is random, for each trajectory we repeat every experiment 25 times, and present the
average performance results. According to Algorithm 1, a user can modify cl, clr, k, kr and δ
with her requirement in the consecutive request of obfuscation rectangles for an MkNN query.
However, in our experiments, for the sake of simplicity, we use fixed values for these parameters
in the consecutive requests of obfuscation rectangles for an MkNN query. The default value for the
user’s safe distance δ is set to 10.
We consider the overlapping rectangle attack and the combined attack (i.e., the overlapping
rectangle attach and the maximum movement bound attack) in our experiments. The combined
attack arises when the user’s maximum velocity is known to the LSP. To derive the maximum
movement bound in case of combined attack, we set the user’s maximum velocity as 60 km/hour.
For simplicity, we assume that the user also moves at constant velocity of 60 km/hour.
The query evaluation time, I/Os, and the answer set size for a PMkNN query is measured by
adding the required query evaluation time, I/Os, and answer set size for every requested obfuscation
rectangle per trajectory of length 5000 units in the data space of 10,000 × 10,000 square units.
8.2.1 Measuring the level of trajectory privacy
In our experiments, we measure the level of trajectory privacy by two parameters: (i) the trajectory
area, i.e., the approximated location of the user’s trajectory by the LSP, and (ii) the frequency,
i.e., the number of requested obfuscation rectangles per a user’s trajectory for a fixed obfuscation
rectangle area.
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The trajectory area is computed from the available knowledge of the LSP. The LSP knows the
set of obfuscated rectangles provided by a user and the known region for each obfuscated rectangle.
The LSP does not know the user’s required confidence level clr and the required number of data
objects kr and thus, cannot compute GCR(clr, kr). Although the LSP can compute GCR(cl, k)
from the user’s specified confidence level cl and the specified number of data object k, GCR(cl, k)
does not guarantee that the user’s location resides in GCR(cl, k) for the current obfuscation
rectangle. We know that the user needs to reside within GCR(clr, kr) of the current obfuscation
rectangle to ensure the required confidence level for the required number of data objects. However,
the LSP knows the known region C(o, r) and that GCR(clr, kr) must be inside the known region
of the current obfuscation rectangle because the confidence level of the user for any data object
outside the known region is 0. Thus, the trajectory area for a user’s trajectory is defined as the
union of the known regions with respect to the set of obfuscation rectangles provided by the user
for that trajectory. When the LSP knows the maximum velocity, then the LSP can use the maximum
movement bound in addition to the known region to determine the trajectory area. Formally, we
define trajectory area as follows:
Definition 8.1 (Trajectory Area) Let {R1, R2, ..., Rn} be a set of n consecutive rectangles
requested by a user to an LSP in an MkNN query, Ci(o, r) be the known region corresponding
to Ri, and Mi be the maximum movement bound corresponding to Ri. The trajectory area is
computed as ∪1≤i≤n−1(Ci(o, r) ∩Mi) ∪ Cn(o, r). If the maximum bound is unknown to the LSP
then the trajectory area is expressed as ∪1≤i≤nCi(o, r).
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Figure 14: The bold line shows the trajectory area if the maximum velocity is (a) unknown to the
LSP, (b) known to the LSP
Figure 14(a) and 14(b) show trajectory areas when the user’s maximum velocity is either
unknown or known to the LSP, respectively. The larger the trajectory area, the higher the privacy
for the user. This is because the probability is high for a large trajectory area to contain different
sensitive locations and the probability is low that an LSP can link the user’s trajectory with a
specific location. On the other hand, for a fixed obfuscation rectangle area, a lower frequency for a
33
trajectory represents high level of trajectory privacy since a smaller number of spatial constraints
are available for an LSP to predict the user’s trajectory.
In our experiments, we compute the trajectory area through Monte Carlo Simulation. We
randomly generate 1 million points in the total space. For the overlapping rectangle attack, we
determine the trajectory area as the percentage of points that fall inside ∪1≤i≤nCi(o, r). On the
other hand, for the combined attack (i.e., the maximum velocity is known to the LSP), we determine
the trajectory area as the percentage of points that fall inside ∪1≤i≤n−1(Ci(o, r) ∩Mi) ∪ Cn(o, r).
Thus, the trajectory area is measured as percentage of the total data space. On the other hand,
the frequency is measured as the number of requested obfuscation rectangles per trajectory of
length 5000 units in the data space of 10,000 × 10,000 square units.
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Figure 15: The effect of the obfuscation rectangle area on the level of trajectory privacy for the
California data set
8.2.2 The effect of obfuscation rectangle area
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the effect of obfuscation rectangle area on the three
privacy protection options for our algorithm REQUEST PMkNN. In the first option, the user
sacrifices the accuracy of answers to achieve trajectory privacy. Using this option, the user’s
required confidence level is lower than 1 and the user specifies higher confidence level to
the LSP than her required one. In this set of experiments, we represent the first option for
our algorithm REQUEST PMkNN(cl, clr, k, kr) as REQUEST PMkNN(1,0.75,10,10), where the
user hides the required confidence level 0.75 from the LSP, instead specifies 1 for the confidence
level. In the second option, the user does not sacrifice the accuracy of the answers for her
trajectory privacy; instead the user specifies a higher number of data objects to the LSP than her
required one. For the second option, we set the parameters of REQUEST PMkNN(cl, clr, k, kr)
as REQUEST PMkNN(1,1,20,10). In the third option, the user hides both of the required
confidence level and the required number of data objects. Thus, the third option is represented
as REQUEST PMkNN(1,0.75,20,10).
We vary the obfuscation rectangle area from 0.001% to 0.01% of the total data space. For all the
three options, we observe in Figures 15(a) and 15(b) that the frequency decreases with the increase
of the obfuscation rectangle area for both overlapping rectangle attack and combined attack,
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respectively. On the other hand, Figures 15(c) and 15(d) show that the trajectory area increases
with the increase of the obfuscation rectangle area for overlapping rectangle attack and combined
attack, respectively. Thus, the larger the obfuscation rectangle area, the higher the trajectory privacy
in terms of both frequency and trajectory area. This is because the larger the obfuscation rectangle
the higher the probability that the obfuscation rectangle covers a longer part of a user’s trajectory.
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Figure 16: The effect of the obfuscation rectangle area on the query processing performance for
the California data set
Figures 15(a) and 15(b) also show that the frequency for hiding both confidence level and the
number of NNs is smaller than those for hiding them independently for any obfuscation rectangle
area, since each of them contributes to extend the GCR(clr, kr). In addition, we observe that the
rate of decrease of frequency with the increase of the obfuscation rectangle area is more significant
for the option of hiding the confidence level than the option of hiding the number of NNs.
We observe from Figures 15(a) and 15(b) that the frequency in the combined attack is higher
than that of the overlapping rectangle attack. The underlying cause is as follows. In our algorithm to
protect the overlapping rectangle attack the obfuscation rectangle needs to be generated inside the
current known region. On the other hand, in case of the combined attack the obfuscation rectangle
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needs to be inside the intersection of maximum movement bound and the known region. Due to the
stricter constraints while generating the obfuscation rectangle to overcome the combined attack, the
frequency becomes higher for the combined attack than that of the overlapping rectangle attack. For
the same reason, the trajectory area is smaller for the combined attack than that of the overlapping
rectangle attack as shown in Figures 15(c) and 15(d).
In Figures 16(a)-(d), we observe that both I/Os and time follow the similar trend of frequency,
as expected. On the other hand, the answer set size shows an increasing trend with the increase
of the obfuscation rectangle area in Figure 16(e)-(f). We also run all of these experiments for
other data sets and the results show similar trends to those of California data set except that of the
answer set size. The different trends of the answer set size may result from different density and
distributions of data objects.
8.2.3 The effect of clr and cl
In these experiments, we observe the effect of the required and specified confidence level on the
level of trajectory privacy. We vary the value of the required confidence level and the specified
confidence level from 0.5 to 0.9 and 0.6 to 1, respectively.
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Figure 17: The effect of hiding the required confidence level on the level of trajectory privacy
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Figure 18: The effect of hiding the specified confidence level on the level of trajectory privacy
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Figures 17(a)-(b) show that the frequency increases with the increase of the required confidence
level clr for a fixed specified confidence level cl = 1. We observe that the larger the difference
between required and specified confidence level, the higher the level of trajectory privacy in terms
of the frequency because the larger difference causes the larger extension of GCR(clr, kr). On the
other hand, Figures 17(c)-(d) show that the trajectory area almost remain constant for different clr
as cl remains fixed.
Figure 18(a)-(b)) shows that the frequency decreases with the increase of the specified
confidence level cl for a fixed required confidence level clr = 0.5. With the increase of cl, for
a fixed clr, the extension of GCR(clr, kr) becomes larger and the level of trajectory privacy in
terms of frequency increases. On the other hand, Figures 18(c)-(d) show that the trajectory area
increases with the increase of cl, as expected.
We observe from Figures 17 and 18 that the frequency is higher and the trajectory area is
smaller in case of the combined attack than those for the case of the overlapping rectangle attack,
which is expected due to stricter constraints in the generation of obfuscation rectangle in the
combined attack than that of the overlapping rectangle attack.
We also see that a user can achieve a high level of trajectory privacy in terms of frequency
by reducing the value of clr slightly. For example, in case of the overlapping rectangle attack, the
average rate of decrease of frequency are 19% and 10% for reducing the clr from 0.9 to 0.8 and
from 0.6 to 0.5, respectively, for a fixed cl = 1. In case of the combined attack, the average rate of
decrease of frequency are 23% and 11% for reducing the clr from 0.9 to 0.8 and from 0.6 to 0.5,
respectively, for a fixed cl = 1. Since the trajectory area almost remains constant for different clr,
and we can conclude that a user can achieve a high level of trajectory privacy by sacrificing the
accuracy of query answers slightly. On the other hand, from Figures 18, we can see that the level
of trajectory privacy in terms of both frequency and trajectory area achieves maximum when the
specified confidence level is set to 1.
Note that the query processing overhead for a PMkNN query can be approximated by
multiplying the frequency for that query with the query processing overhead of single obfuscation
rectangle (Section 8.1).
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Figure 19: The effect of hiding the required number of NNs on the level of trajectory privacy
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Figure 20: The effect of hiding the specified number of NNs on the level of trajectory privacy
8.2.4 The effect of kr and k
In these experiments, we observe the effect of the required and the specified number of nearest
data objects on the level of trajectory privacy. We vary the value of the required and the specified
number of nearest data objects from 1 to 20 and 5 to 25, respectively.
Figures 19(a)-(b) show that the frequency increases with the increase of the required number
of nearest data objects kr for a fixed specified number of nearest data objects k = 25. Similar to
the case of confidence level, we find that the larger the difference between required and specified
number of nearest data objects, the higher the level of trajectory privacy in terms of frequency. On
the other hand, Figures 19(c)-(d) show that the trajectory area almost remains constant for different
kr.
Figures 20 show that the frequency decreases and the trajectory area increases with the increase
of k for a fixed kr = 1, which is expected as seen in case of confidence level.
Similar to confidence level, we also observe from Figures 19 and 20 that the frequency is
higher and the trajectory area is smaller in case of the combined attack than those for the case of
the overlapping rectangle attack.
In Figures 20, we also see that the rate of increase of the level of trajectory privacy in terms of
both frequency and trajectory area decreases with the increase of k. For example, the highest gain
in the level of trajectory privacy for both frequency and trajectory area is achieved when the value
of k is increased from 5 to 10. Thus, we conclude that the value of k can be set to 10 to achieve a
good level of trajectory privacy for a fixed kr = 1.
8.2.5 The effect of δ
We vary δ from 0 to 20 and find the effect of δ on the level of trajectory privacy in terms
of frequency and trajectory area. Figures 21(a)-(b) show that the frequency increases with the
increase of δ for both the overlapping rectangle attack and the combined attack. On the other hand,
Figures 21(c)-(d) show that the trajectory area almost remains constant for different δ.
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Figure 21: The effect of δ on the level of trajectory privacy
9 Conclusions
We have developed the first approach to protect a user’s trajectory privacy for MkNN queries. We
have identified the overlapping rectangle attack in an MkNN query and proposed a technique
to issue an MkNN query request (i.e., request k NNs for consecutive obfuscation rectangles)
that overcomes this attack. Our technique provides a user with three options: if a user does not
want to sacrifice the accuracy of answers then the user can protect her privacy by specifying (i)
a higher number of NNs than required; otherwise, the user can specify (ii) a higher confidence
level than required or (iii) higher values for both confidence level and the number of NNs. We
have validated our trajectory privacy protection technique with experiments and have found that
the larger the difference between the specified confidence level (or the specified number of NNs)
and the required confidence level (or the required number of NNs), the higher the level of trajectory
privacy for MkNN queries. An additional advantage of using a lower confidence level is reduced
query processing cost. We have also proposed an efficient algorithm, CLAPPINQ, that evaluates
the k NNs for an obfuscation rectangle with a specified confidence level, which is an essential
component for processing PMkNN queries. Experimental results have shown that CLAPPINQ is at
least two times faster than Casper and requires at least three times less I/Os.
In the future, we aim to extend our approach for the privacy of data objects. For example, in
a friend finder application, where users wish to track their k-nearest friends continuously, privacy
is required for both the user issuing the query and the data objects (i.e., friends). We also plan to
integrate the constraints of a road network while protecting trajectory privacy for MkNN queries.
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